Death and Disinformation: Why should we be worried about Russian propaganda?

Written by Freya Jones, journalist and writer, currently in her fourth year studying German at the University of Oxford. Freya works for OSINT Ukraine (Open Source Intelligence Ukraine) and has written for The Telegraph amongst other publications.

Two-and-a-half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its battlefield performance has been largely unimpressive. Putin’s aim of taking Kyiv within days has turned into a bloody war of attrition, with the aggressor state unable to fulfil its military objectives in the face of Ukrainian resistance.

However, the impact of Russian disinformation warfare continues to be underestimated in the West – which is dangerous, because this is precisely where Putin has the upper hand.

NATO’s information warfare doctrine is protective, focused on controlling its own media space and combating sabotage. On the other hand, Russia’s policy is aggressive, seeking to infiltrate Western societies and pollute public discourse with Kremlin propaganda. So far, Russia’s overwhelming success in the disinformation space is because its narratives are easily disguised and difficult to identify. In addition, they’re often delivered by third parties.

The Kremlin has form in letting others do its dirty work, utilising its international networks of influence to exploit political divisions in the West. Populism is rising in Europe, and parties which are nationalist, Eurosceptic or otherwise against the liberal democratic status quo are all potential allies for Putin, with Orbán’s Hungary, Reform UK, Rassemblement National (France), AfD (Germany), BSW (Germany), Die Linke (Germany), and FPÖ (Austria) being core examples.

Prominent actors in all these parties are singing from Putin’s playbook. Some of them have been paid directly – such as AfD politician Petr Bystron who received over €20,000 from a pro-Russian news organisation financed by Putin’s oligarch friend Viktor Medvechuk. For others, it may be a more subtle relationship of mutual convenience – if populist Sahra Wagenknecht opposes aid to Ukraine, or Marine Le Pen speaks out against sanctions, Putin isn’t going to complain.

So, irrespective of exactly who’s saying them, which Kremlin narratives should ring alarm bells (to name a few)?

-          “Many Ukrainians want to be part of Russia.”

This narrative might have arisen from the fact that east Ukrainian regions unanimously supported pro-Russian candidates in presidential elections up until the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Culturally, Ukraine’s east is much closer to Russia than the west, although public opinion across the country has turned solidly against Russia since the full-scale invasion began. And beyond this, there are also many Ukrainians who never wanted closer ties with Russia in the first place.

-          “Russia is “denazifying” Ukraine.”

Unfortunately, one regiment of Ukraine’s National Guard, the “Azov Brigade”, originated as a self-funded volunteer militia with neo-Nazi ideology before it was formally incorporated into service. Since the full-scale invasion, pro-Russian politicians in Europe (for example, in Germany’s Die Linke party) have used this as an argument against supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues to exaggerate it as justification for the invasion and killing of innocent Ukrainians.

-          “NATO expansionism provoked Russia to invade Ukraine.”

Kremlin-aligned actors commonly depict Ukraine as an American puppet regime on Russia’s border, arguing that Putin had reasonable grounds for launching the full-scale invasion in the interests of national security. Indeed, Reform UK’s Nigel Farage (a self-proclaimed Putin admirer) notably said the war is “a consequence of EU and NATO expansionism”, adding “we provoked it”. For a Western politician, this narrative is flawed, not least because it fails to acknowledge Ukraine’s own will as a sovereign nation – other than a short period (2010-2014), when the then-government favoured an affirmation of neutral status, Ukraine has been in consistent cooperation and dialogue with NATO since the 1990s, enshrining NATO aims in its Constitution in 2019. Furthermore, Ukrainian accession to NATO needn’t have represented a casus belli for Russia in any case if the latter truly harboured no imperialistic ambitions.

Troublingly, rightful protection of free speech in the West means that figures who espouse these propaganda narratives often find a platform. Therefore, it’s crucial for the public to be able to identify when false, harmful, populist arguments play into Putin’s interests, and remain aware that an unnervingly high number of the espousers have confirmed or suspected links to the Kremlin.

However, manipulating third parties isn’t Russia’s only means of influence. Over the past decades, organisations such as Russo-French think-tank Institut de la Démocratie et de la Coopération have also been set up to “monitor the state of free speech in the West”... So if the world’s Nigel Farages or Sahra Wagenknechts face any backlash or censorship, we can reasonably assume it’s a little black mark against the West in the eyes of the Kremlin, and further justification for aggression. One recent example of this was Germany’s attempt to ban the extreme-right and anti-Ukrainian COMPACT Magazine, which was heavily criticised by the AfD’s recognised pro-Russian wing.

Meanwhile, there have been instances of Russian embassy staff photographing and recording pro-Ukrainian demonstrations in a number of European cities. It’s possible that the aim of this is pure intimidation, or re-purposing footage as “evidence” of anti-Russian sentiment to fuel perceptions of self-victimhood within Russia.

And beyond this, it would be wrong to overlook the impact of soft power. Russia has an undeniably rich culture which is admired worldwide, but the extent to which this has been uniformly weaponised makes it deeply problematic. Representation abroad is something Russia takes extremely seriously – in fact, a designated Kremlin agency, Rossotrudnichestvo, has been tasked with organising Russian language classes, music events and film screenings through a network of so-called “Russian Houses” around the world, which it continues to do. As a result, it’s difficult to find Russian cultural events which don’t come with ingrained propaganda or Kremlin-sympathising network opportunities.

Overall, Europe is at greater risk from Russia’s disinformation warfare than the United States. Of course, Putin may be playing 4D chess in his endorsement of Kamala Harris (if we assume he thinks American voters will interpret this as fear for Trump and then vote for him, in reality delivering a President set on abandoning Ukraine), but theories such as these are highly speculative. While the United States undoubtedly needs to safeguard its cyberspace and stand firm in commitment to NATO, Russia threatens Europe ideologically, economically and geographically.

Learning how Russian propaganda creates doubts and division from within can help us to identify where information warfare seeks to destabilise our values as the war in Ukraine goes on.